The Ontology of Presence
Hans Gadamer (art & design school collaboration between Llotja and Amical Wikimedia) - Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0
There is a necessary “voice” that is shaped by principles of an ontological nature and that renders us, as human beings, privileged entities. This Heideggerian being-there [Dasein] places us before a world that presents itself to us as radical, originary, and that reveals to us at every moment the evidence of our own existence. Thus, our need for interpretation is great—the need to try to understand what surrounds us, ourselves, the other, the fellow being. This dialogical relation is, above all, a relation established within us at a level of universality that, as Gadamer defines it in Truth and Method, “(…) overtakes our willing and doing; it comes upon us, or happens to us” (Gadamer, 1999: 14). We stand, perhaps, before the essential act of human thought, the space in which language acts as the primary form of human life, constructing cultural values and giving shape to a humanity grounded in a profound common accord.
This prior, originary accord sustains belief, the result of a conviction that precedes any possibility of objective verification. Does it thus emerge as a kind of doxa, capable of functioning as an untenable metaphysics? This would hold true only if being were forgotten. Hermeneutics arises as a continuous process of questioning, an attempt to comprehend what appears to our consciousness — though this time emphasizing the linguistic dimension of logos. Language and History will recall being to mind, not by evading it, but by placing it at the center of the inquiry (Magalhães, 2002).
It is in radical, organic intuition that the world becomes expressive, drawing on a sensitive-spiritual mode of existence that rejects the predominantly methodological character of the historical interpretation proposed by Dilthey — Gadamer thereby rejecting that Cartesian criterion of truth which is “(…) the prejudice against prejudice” (Magalhães, 2002: 45). The doors are thus opened to a hermeneutics of a philosophical nature: “[…] the human relation, like our relation to the world, is basically and simply linguistic, and is therefore comprehensible. Hermeneutics is a universal medium of the being of philosophy, and not merely a methodological foundation for the hermeneutic disciplines” (Gadamer, quoted in Magalhães, 2002: 45).
Understanding is not, and for Gadamer never could be, a subjective comportment toward a given object. It belongs to effective history [Wirkungsgeschichte]. To understand is not a scientific instance but something profoundly bound to the human experience of the world. Prejudice thus functions as the pre-structure of understanding. For Gadamer, tradition and history are viewed as fundamental temporal questions — not from an objective standpoint, but within a relation that shapes the projective character of understanding (Gadamer, 1999). History is, in this sense, not a mere task of decipherment. Understanding thus emerges as a universal determination, and not as a mere exercise of the subject.
It is the limits imposed by the methodological concept of science that constitute the core of hermeneutic concerns. For Gadamer, “(…) the hermeneutic phenomenon is not, in any way, a problem of method” (Gadamer, 1999: 31). This independent vitality of hermeneutics makes it the “herald” of truth, a truth that exceeds the control of scientific methodology. The Age of Enlightenment would call into question the prejudice that, for Gadamer, is a condition for understanding. There are no concepts without prior experience to orient them, just as there can be no rationality without prejudices. Tradition gives us our point of view. It is the transmission of a way of seeing the world that conditions us. Hegel would call it “substance.”
But understanding cannot be merely the given, inherited datum of tradition. There exists a historical knowledge conscious of its own historicity, which makes evident the fact that proximity and distance coexist simultaneously between the interpreted object and the interpreter. This temporal distance is a condition conducive to understanding. This span of time mediating past and present is grounded in tradition: “the hermeneutic question, then, is that of temporal distance” (Magalhães, 2002: 46). This distance might be understood as a difficulty for comprehension: the object presents itself to us as strange. But for Gadamer, this distance opens the door to genuine understanding, since the receiver is bound by the expectations of his or her own time (Magalhães, 2002).
In light of the ideas already discussed, an important concept emerges: the fusion of horizons. No one can abstract themselves from who they are, yet there exists a strong capacity within us for entering into dialogue. What happens when we appreciate a work from the past is that we set out from our own horizon. The horizon of the work is not our horizon. Gadamer views these horizons not from a historicist perspective — in which the interpreter’s horizon and the work’s horizon stand apart — but as a single horizon resulting from the interpreter’s capacity to place themselves within the situation of the other. In this sense, the term fusion of horizons is coined through the existence of an alterity: that of the interpreter and that of the interpreted.
Contrary to what the Historical School intended, Gadamer rejects the interpreter’s divestment of their own conceptions and judgments. The hermeneutic circle is thus reformulated: “the effects of History form an integral part of the work of interpretation, and what matters is becoming conscious of the conditions under which that interpretation takes place” (Magalhães, 2002: 47). In transporting itself to historical horizons, historical consciousness does not transfer itself into heteroclite territories that have nothing to do with us; on the contrary, it seeks, from within, to embrace the historical depth of our own self-consciousness. There is no anomie, but rather a single horizon that encompasses everything historical consciousness contains within itself. In order to be able to move ourselves into a given situation, we must possess our own horizon (Gadamer, 1999).
Modernity opens space for an alienation of an aesthetic character. There is a tendency to evaluate objects according to subjective criteria, in accordance with the sensibility of the observer. This fact “(…) is a consequence of the general subjectivization of thought carried out since Descartes, a tendency to ground all knowledge in subjective self-certainty” (Palmer, 1969: 171). In this way, the emptying-out of the consciousness of the one who experiences the work of art enjoys the immediacy of a purely sensory form. It amounts to nothing more than a response to form, a timeless moment. We are faced with the absence of genuine knowledge in the enjoyment of the work of art.
According to Gadamer, art must be evaluated according to its own criteria. The work reveals itself and reveals its author. The work of art calls upon us to see further, to “hear its voice.” We become conscious of alterity only if we displace ourselves, only if we abstract ourselves from who we are. To alienate is to refuse to let the work speak for itself. And the more we observe it, the more our understanding is enriched: “the experience of encountering a work of art opens up a world for us” (Palmer, 1069:172). The work of art should not be regarded as an object that we dissect in order to analyze it formally. It should be seen, instead, as a question that is posed to us (Palmer, 1969).
It is worth concluding this brief reflection with what distinguishes understanding from knowledge. The opposition between tradition and reason is regarded by Gadamer not so much as an unconditional and irreducible opposition, but rather as the necessity of combating an abstractly theoretical conception of reason (Magalhães, 2002). Gadamer’s rehabilitation of tradition and authority seeks to show that prejudice is not synonymous with false judgment, but rather carries the possibility of being understood as either positive or negative. Hence the importance of a hermeneutic circle that feeds on prior concepts which are gradually replaced by other, more adequate ones. There is a movement of re-projection that draws on belief, understood as a structure of anticipation, and which must be subject to confirmation. This is the understanding of the whole and of its parts.
We set out on this interpretive process grounded in authority, in that which inspires trust, in a tradition we cannot refuse. This is a lengthy argument that renders the world an expressive place, one that becomes conscious of itself through history. A world linguistically constituted, in a kind of measure, reinforced by its radical nature, one that is scarcely anticipated. Thus, the work of art emerges as an event that interrogates us and calls us toward a profoundly dialogical human existence. Language is the mode through which a lived world is revealed. Art, too, as language, creates the possibility for human beings to have a world, to conceive of their own understanding in as expansive a manner as possible: “understanding, says Gadamer, is always a historical, dialectical, [and] linguistic event” (Palmer, 1969: 216).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Gadamer, H-G. (1999). Verdade e Método. Traços fundamentais de uma hermenêutica filosófica. (3ªed.). Petrópolis: Editora Vozes.
Magalhães, R. (2002). Introdução à Hermenêutica. Coimbra: Angelus Novus.
Palmer, R. (1969). Hermenêutica. Lisboa: Edições 70.